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The Wellbeing–Consumption Paradox: Happiness, Health, Income, and 1 
Carbon Emissions in Growing versus Non-Growing Economies 2 
Andrew L. Fanning and Daniel W. O’Neill 3 
Abstract 4 
We investigate the relationships between carbon-intensive consumption and two dimensions of 5 
human wellbeing (physical health and happiness) for ~120 countries over the 2005–2015 period. 6 
Long-term (~10-year) relationships are analysed to re-assess the “happiness–income paradox” (i.e. 7 
Easterlin paradox) which states that changes in national income and happiness are correlated in the 8 
short-term, but not in the long-term. We broaden the scope of Easterlin’s analysis in two novel ways. 9 
First, the evidence for a “health–income” paradox is explored. Second, a parallel analysis using 10 
national consumption-based carbon footprints (instead of income) is conducted to explore 11 
complementary relationships with both of the wellbeing indicators. We show that countries with 12 
declining per capita consumption, measured in terms of either gross domestic product (GDP) or 13 
carbon footprint, have significant reductions in average happiness. In contrast, countries with 14 
growing per capita consumption have no significant change in happiness. There is no relationship 15 
between changes in per capita consumption and health, irrespective of whether GDP or carbon 16 
footprint is growing or not. These findings apply to rich and poor countries alike and are robust to 17 
the inclusion of other social indicators, such as social support and autonomy. We find that happiness 18 
is less sensitive to declines in carbon footprint than declines in GDP, thus lending support to calls for 19 
“decoupling” carbon emissions from economic growth. However, observed decoupling trends are 20 
insufficient to meet climate targets. If the 2 degree target is to be met without a decline in 21 
wellbeing, then either decoupling must be vastly improved, or happiness levels must be made less 22 
sensitive to declining consumption. 23 
Keywords 24 
Easterlin Paradox; Sustainable Consumption; Wellbeing; Carbon Footprint; Climate Change 25 
Word Count 26 
8,523 words (including 742 words in tables and figure captions)  27 
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1 Introduction 28 
Nearly half a century has passed since Easterlin (1974) made the paradoxical observation that 29 
income and subjective wellbeing are correlated at a given point in time, but happiness does not rise 30 
with income over longer time periods (~10 years or more). This “happiness–income paradox” or 31 
“Easterlin paradox” is still relevant — and contested — because it challenges conventional economic 32 
policy which tends to promote income growth as the main way to increase human wellbeing 33 
(Stevenson and Wolfers, 2008; Easterlin et al., 2010).  34 
Meanwhile, there is little debate that income growth is tightly coupled to an increase in carbon 35 
emissions, and that this increase risks pushing the climate system into a new, more hostile, state 36 
with potentially drastic consequences for society (Tapia Granados et al., 2012; Knight and Schor, 37 
2014; Steffen et al., 2015a). It is a challenge for countries to achieve the mainstream goal of “green 38 
growth”, i.e. to decouple carbon emissions from aggregate output at a rate that is sufficiently rapid 39 
to meet climate targets (Bassetti et al., 2013; Antal and van den Bergh, 2016). The decoupling 40 
challenge is more difficult for countries that are net importers of upstream carbon emissions after 41 
international trade is taken into account using a consumption-based approach, i.e. carbon footprint 42 
(Peters et al., 2011; Hoekstra and Wiedmann, 2014). 43 
The debates over the Easterlin paradox and decoupling are both concerned with how changes in 44 
economic activity are related to changes in other important quantities over time, i.e. happiness and 45 
a stable climate. To date, however, there have been very few empirical studies that consider the 46 
dependence of happiness on carbon emissions directly, and none that investigate this relationship 47 
over time (cf. Knight and Rosa, 2011; Lenzen and Cummins, 2013; York and Bell, 2014; Ambrey and 48 
Daniels, 2017). That being said, there is an important body of sustainability research that analyses 49 
the relationships between carbon emissions and a number of objective wellbeing indicators, such as 50 
life expectancy (e.g. Steinberger et al., 2012; Lamb and Rao, 2015; Jorgenson et al., 2017).  51 
Here, we adopt the approach taken by O’Neill et al. (2018), which views life satisfaction and life 52 
expectancy as complementary measures of wellbeing, and perform a comparative analysis of the 53 
relationship between both of these indicators and carbon-intensive consumption over time. We 54 
argue that per capita values of carbon footprint and national income can be seen as alternative 55 
proxies for the wellbeing gains of consumption based on different characteristics embodied within 56 
final goods and services (i.e. upstream carbon emissions versus market value). The inclusion of 57 
income in our analysis also permits the comparison of our results with other studies in the ongoing 58 
debate surrounding the happiness–income paradox (e.g. Stevenson and Wolfers, 2013). 59 
Specifically, we explore the empirical relationships between each wellbeing–consumption pair 60 
across nearly 120 countries over the 2005–2015 period. Of particular relevance to the decoupling 61 
debate, we ask whether there is a fundamental difference in these relationships depending on 62 
whether consumption is increasing or decreasing. In short, we explore the evidence for a generalised 63 
“wellbeing–consumption paradox” with an explicit focus on differences in the relationships between 64 
growing and non-growing economies. 65 
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews relevant literature on 66 
subjective and objective wellbeing and the environment. Section 3 includes an overview of the 67 
methods used in our empirical analysis, while Section 4 presents our findings on the relationships 68 
between wellbeing and consumption over the 2005–2015 period. Section 5 discusses the broader 69 
implications of our results for debates surrounding the Easterlin paradox, sustainable consumption, 70 
and human wellbeing. Section 6 concludes. 71 
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2 Wellbeing and the Environment 72 
There are a number of different ways of conceptualising human wellbeing. The notion of wellbeing 73 
in mainstream economics draws on the utilitarianism of Mill (1863), who argued that the right action 74 
is the one that produces the greatest net happiness for all concerned. The Aristotelian notion of 75 
eudemonia, or “flourishing”, represents the main alternative to the utilitarian perspective (O’Neill, 76 
2008). Eudemonic wellbeing argues that happiness is derived from becoming one’s best self, which is 77 
a process influenced by the surrounding contexts of people’s lives, notably their opportunities for 78 
good health, autonomy, and meaningful relations with others (Ryff and Singer, 2008). Eudemonic 79 
wellbeing underpins several prominent development approaches, including the capabilities 80 
approach (Nussbaum, 2003; Sen, 1985), human needs frameworks (Doyal and Gough, 1991; Max-81 
Neef, 1991), and models of psychosocial wellbeing (Ryan and Deci, 2000; Ryff and Keyes, 1995). 82 
2.1 Subjective Wellbeing 83 
Subjective wellbeing measures people’s appraisals and evaluations of their own lives. It can be 84 
measured by asking people to evaluate their overall level of satisfaction with life (or health, finances, 85 
etc.), or by asking them to provide emotional responses in terms of pleasant versus unpleasant 86 
experiences (Diener et al., 2018). Here, we focus on the cognitive evaluation that people provide of 87 
their own lives (i.e. life satisfaction), as the latter is the most common measure used in the 88 
happiness–income literature. The terms “happiness” and “life satisfaction” are used interchangeably 89 
throughout the article to refer to this evaluative measure. 90 
The relation between happiness and income over time has been the topic of much debate. 91 
Explanations by those who generally accept Easterlin’s (1974) finding that happiness does not 92 
increase as income rises over time focus on how people compare their incomes relative to others or 93 
to their past self (Clark et al., 2008). The idea is that the happiness you obtain from an increase in 94 
income can be offset if others get larger income increases, or if you get a smaller increase than you 95 
aspired to, thereby leaving the national happiness level unchanged despite sustained income 96 
increases (Easterlin et al., 2010; Layard et al., 2010).  97 
However, there are a number of studies that find that average happiness levels do increase with 98 
income over time, but at a decreasing rate similar to the relation observed in the cross-section 99 
(Stevenson and Wolfers, 2008; Diener et al., 2013; Veenhoven and Vergunst, 2014). A lack of 100 
consistent time-series data across countries has been identified as a major challenge in the debate 101 
over the Easterlin paradox (Knight and Rosa, 2011; Stevenson and Wolfers, 2013). 102 
The magnitude of the happiness–income relationship in the studies that do find a statistically 103 
significant result is typically quite small in terms of practical significance (Beja Jr., 2014). For 104 
example, despite Veenhoven and Vergunst’s (2014) eye-catching title “The Easterlin Illusion: 105 
Economic Growth Does Go With Greater Happiness”, the authors find that  a 1% increase in annual 106 
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is associated with an increase in average life satisfaction of 107 
only 0.003 points on a 0 to 10 scale. Put another way, this result suggests that to achieve a 1 point 108 
increase in happiness would require GDP per capita to grow at a rate of 5% per year for 60 years! 109 
There has been relatively little research on income reductions in the happiness economics literature, 110 
with the few studies that do exist focussing on the individual (Vendrik and Woltjer, 2007; Di Tella et 111 
al., 2010; Boyce et al., 2013; Sekulova and van den Bergh, 2013; Boyce et al., 2016). Easterlin (2009) 112 
and De Neve et al. (2017) provide the only two analyses at the national level, as far as we are aware. 113 
Using a small sample of post-Soviet transition countries, Easterlin (2009) finds average happiness 114 
and national income moved together over a ~10-year collapse and recovery period. De Neve et al. 115 
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(2017) examine year-on-year changes for a large number of countries and find that average life 116 
satisfaction is more than five times as sensitive to income contraction as it is to income growth.  117 
In general, income losses seem to have a stronger effect on happiness than income gains at both the 118 
individual and national level, a finding predicted by the concept of loss aversion in prospect theory 119 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). That being said, there is debate as to the level of adaptation to such 120 
losses over time, and there is also a need for additional cross-country research to assess De Neve et 121 
al.’s (2017) findings from a longer-term perspective. 122 
To date, only a few studies have analysed the relationship between happiness and carbon emissions 123 
directly. At the national level, O’Neill et al. (2018) examine a cross-section of more than 150 124 
countries and find a bivariate relationship between life satisfaction and carbon footprint that 125 
exhibits diminishing returns at higher emission levels. At the household level, surveys in Canada, 126 
Sweden, and Australia suggest a weak to non-existent relationship between life satisfaction and 127 
carbon emissions after controlling for other explanatory variables, including income (Ambrey and 128 
Daniels, 2017; Andersson et al., 2014; Wilson et al., 2013).  129 
One potential explanation for the lack of a relationship when controlling for explanatory variables 130 
could be the very high correlation between carbon emissions and income shown by previous 131 
research (Lamb et al., 2014). Given the fossil fuel dependence of modern economic activity, we 132 
suspect both indicators are measuring the same thing, i.e. variation in the aggregate consumption of 133 
goods and services. 134 
Other environmental factors that have received attention in the subjective wellbeing literature 135 
include air pollution, natural disasters, and bad weather (which seem to make people less happy), 136 
while being outdoors and nice weather seem to make them happier (Ferreira et al., 2013; 137 
MacKerron and Mourato, 2013; Maddison and Rehdanz, 2011; Sekulova and van den Bergh, 2016). 138 
Non-environmental factors which have been shown to affect happiness include genetic 139 
predisposition, personal circumstances such as marriage or unemployment, and social issues such as 140 
inequality, corruption, social support, and personal autonomy (Bartels, 2015; Helliwell et al., 2016; 141 
Luhmann et al., 2012; Oishi et al., 2011; Tay et al., 2014). 142 
2.2 Objective Wellbeing 143 
Income is the most widely used indicator of objective wellbeing in the climate change literature, 144 
thanks to the widespread use of integrated assessment models (IAMs).  IAMs analyse the costs and 145 
benefits of climate mitigation versus damages in monetary terms, and the results of these cost–146 
benefit analyses are often used to estimate least-cost mitigation pathways and the “social cost of 147 
carbon” (Nordhaus, 2017).  148 
National pledges to reduce emissions still remain far below the rapid and sustained reductions 149 
needed to keep warming below 2 °C (Rogelj et al., 2016). At least part of this gap can be explained 150 
using IAM results, which generally suggest the forgone income growth associated with stringent 151 
mitigation policy would be too costly for society, since wellbeing is equated with income under the 152 
assumptions of welfare economics (van den Bergh, 2010).  153 
A growing number of studies are moving beyond the narrow focus on income by adopting 154 
eudemonic perspectives to analyse the empirical relationships between wellbeing and carbon-155 
intensive development across countries (Abdallah et al., 2012; Brand-Correa et al., 2018; Jorgenson, 156 
2014; Lamb and Rao, 2015; Steinberger et al., 2012). In contrast to the coupling observed between 157 
income and carbon emissions, a host of non-income measures of wellbeing show steep diminishing 158 
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returns with increasing levels of environmental impact across countries (Mazur and Rosa, 1974; 159 
O’Neill et al., 2018). The levels of income and carbon emissions associated with a high level of life 160 
expectancy, probably the most common indicator of wellbeing after income, have been shown to be 161 
declining steadily over time across countries (Preston, 2007; Steinberger and Roberts, 2010). 162 
In summary, a number of research gaps emerge from the diverse strands of literature that inform 163 
our analysis. First, there is virtually no empirical understanding of the relationship between 164 
wellbeing and the long-term reductions in carbon emissions needed for a chance of meeting the 2 °C 165 
climate target. Second, although the empirical relation between happiness and income growth has 166 
received considerable attention, there is a surprising lack of cross-country research on the role of 167 
income contractions on wellbeing. Finally, a growing number of studies analyse resource use in 168 
relation to the achievement of basic needs and capabilities based on a eudemonic notion of 169 
wellbeing, but few studies include subjective measures of wellbeing alongside objective indicators. 170 
The remainder of this article discusses our contribution to filling these gaps in current knowledge. 171 
3 Analytic Framework, Data, and Methods 172 
We adopt the analytic approach proposed by O’Neill et al. (2018), who envision life satisfaction and 173 
life expectancy as complementary indicators of wellbeing within a broader analytic framework that 174 
links biophysical resource use to basic needs via the mediating role of provisioning systems. Within 175 
this approach, human wellbeing is seen as a function of both the level to which basic needs are met, 176 
and the degree to which people are satisfied with this level (Costanza et al., 2007). As empirical 177 
support for this view, O’Neill et al. (2018) find that the more social thresholds associated with the 178 
provision of basic needs a country achieves, the healthier and happier its citizens generally are. 179 
We build on O’Neill et al.’s (2018) cross-sectional study by exploring the effects of reductions in 180 
carbon-intensive consumption on wellbeing over time. We test the authors’ suggestion that 181 
resource use (in particular carbon footprint) could be reduced significantly without affecting social 182 
outcomes (i.e. life satisfaction and life expectancy) in wealthy countries. 183 
Our analysis considers the period from 2005 to 2015, which was chosen for two reasons. First, there 184 
is little doubt that the severity of the 2008–09 global economic recession was a defining feature of 185 
the period that was felt to a greater or lesser degree by all countries. In contrast (and less well-186 
known), the 2006–07 period stands out as one in which the number of countries experiencing 187 
recessions was at a historical low (IMF, 2009). These two features make 2005–2015 a singular period 188 
that encompasses the ~10-year contraction and recovery phases of economic activity experienced 189 
simultaneously by an unprecedented number of countries. In the absence of ambitious mitigation 190 
policy, this period provides a natural experiment to analyse current relationships between wellbeing 191 
and the rate of emissions mitigation that climate science suggests is required.  192 
3.1 Dependent Variables 193 
We include life satisfaction and life expectancy as complementary measures of wellbeing in our 194 
analysis. Both indicators are widely used in their respective domains with relatively well-known 195 
advantages and disadvantages (see Stiglitz et al., 2009 for a useful discussion).  196 
Average life satisfaction at the national level is based on individual responses to the Cantril ladder 197 
question, which states: “Please imagine a ladder with steps numbered from 0 at the bottom to 10 at 198 
the top. The top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you and the bottom of the ladder 199 
represents the worst possible life for you. On which step of the ladder would you say you personally 200 
feel you stand at this time?” National average life satisfaction data from 2005 to 2015 were obtained 201 
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from the World Happiness Report (Helliwell et al., 2016), and these data were in turn aggregated 202 
from the 26 January 2016 release of the Gallup World Poll.  203 
Life expectancy at birth estimates the number of years that a newborn infant would live if the 204 
prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout the course 205 
of its life. National average life expectancy data for the 2005–2015 period were obtained from the 206 
World Bank’s (2018) World Development Indicators. 207 
3.2 Independent Variables 208 
To measure the change in consumption levels over time we selected two alternative indicators: GDP 209 
per capita and carbon footprint per capita. GDP measures the total market value of all final goods 210 
and services purchased within a country over the course of a year. Carbon footprint, on the other 211 
hand, is an indicator of environmental pressure that places the ultimate responsibility for upstream 212 
carbon emissions embodied in final goods and services with the individuals who consume them, 213 
regardless of where the emissions actually occur (Hoekstra and Wiedmann, 2014). Our approach 214 
views GDP per capita and carbon footprint per capita as alternative proxies for the wellbeing gains of 215 
consumption based on different characteristics embodied within final goods and services (i.e. 216 
market value versus upstream carbon emissions).  217 
Carbon footprint is an economy-wide measure associated with a single environmental impact (i.e. 218 
climate change). It therefore has a relatively well-defined global boundary in terms of how much 219 
carbon dioxide can be safely emitted into the atmosphere (Steffen et al., 2015b). As a result, 220 
national carbon footprints can be compared to disaggregated shares of a “safe” cumulative global 221 
emissions budget (Fanning and O’Neill, 2016; Peters et al., 2015). 222 
Two other important elements of wellbeing are included in the analysis: social capital and 223 
autonomy. Social capital is generally conceived as the level of networks, norms, and trust that 224 
facilitate mutually beneficial coordination and cooperation (Putnam, 2001). In our study, average 225 
levels of national social capital are indicated by a measure of perceived social support, namely the 226 
percentage of people responding that they have someone to count on for help in times of need. 227 
Autonomy is a widely recognized element determining individuals' capabilities (Sen, 2001). It refers 228 
to the capacity to choose some internally conceived values and commitments without external 229 
constraint. Here, average perceived autonomy is measured as the percentage of people satisfied 230 
with their freedom to make life choices. 231 
GDP is reported in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) adjusted to constant 2011 international 232 
dollars. Population and GDP data were obtained from the World Bank (2018). Consumption-based 233 
carbon emissions were obtained from the updated Peters et al. (2011) dataset published in the 234 
Global Carbon Budget 2017 (Le Quéré et al., 2018). Social support and autonomy data were obtained 235 
from the World Happiness Report (Helliwell et al., 2016). 236 
3.3 Long-Run Trends: Extending the Easterlin Paradox 237 
Following Easterlin et al.’s (2010) method, long-run trends in life satisfaction, life expectancy, GDP 238 
per capita, and carbon footprint per capita were calculated by regressing each of the indicators over 239 
time. Long-run changes in wellbeing are presented in absolute terms for each indicator (i.e. on the 240 
0–10 Cantril ladder scale for happiness, and in years for life expectancy). Long-run growth rates for 241 
GDP per capita and carbon footprint per capita were calculated by regressing the log-transformed 242 
values of each indicator over time, and are presented in percentage terms. 243 
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Countries were selected using a two-step process. First, only countries with observations spanning at 244 
least nine years over the 2005–2015 period were included. This step yielded unbalanced datasets of 245 
119 countries for the GDP per capita analysis (N = 1,084), and 100 countries for the carbon footprint 246 
per capita analysis (N = 919). The correlation between GDP per capita and carbon footprint per 247 
capita was extremely high in the panel (Pearson coefficient between 0.90 and 0.95, depending on 248 
the year). This observation is similar to comparisons reported elsewhere (e.g. Lamb et al., 2014), and 249 
lends support to our view that the two indicators represent alternative proxies for aggregate 250 
consumption. 251 
Second, following the standard “outlier rule”, countries were not included if their long-run trends 252 
were more than 1.5 times the interquartile range observed for any indicator. This second step 253 
yielded 117 countries for the happiness–income pair, 99 countries for the happiness–carbon pair, 254 
109 countries for the health–income pair, and 91 countries for the health–carbon pair. 255 
3.4 Model Estimation Techniques 256 
We used four methods to estimate the dynamic relationships between the wellbeing and 257 
consumption indicators. We estimated cross-sectional relationships at the beginning and end of the 258 
period to investigate changes between the end-points of the analysis period (Section 3.4.1). Long-259 
run changes were analysed using three different model specifications to test for differences in 260 
growing and non-growing economies (Section 3.4.2). We characterised the resilience of wellbeing to 261 
changes in consumption, and assessed whether this resilience was desirable based on long-run 262 
growth rates (Section 3.4.3). Finally, multiple regression panel analysis was conducted to estimate 263 
the contributions of consumption, social support, and autonomy to wellbeing, while controlling for 264 
unobserved heterogeneity across countries and over time (Section 3.4.4). 265 
3.4.1 Comparison of Cross-Sectional Relationships 266 
We draw upon O’Neill et al.’s (2018) finding that a linear-log model provides the best-fit curve to 267 
estimate cross-sectional relationships between carbon footprint and both wellbeing indicators 268 
compared to alternative functional forms, namely linear and saturation curves. The linear-log 269 
ordinary least squares (OLS) model was specified as follows: 270 
 =  + log	() +   (1) 
where   is the wellbeing indicator (either life satisfaction or life expectancy) of country i,  is the 271 
intercept,  is the effect on wellbeing of a one-unit change in that country’s log-transformed level of 272 
consumption  (either GDP per capita or carbon footprint), and   is the country-specific error term. 273 
To test for changes in the cross-sectional relationships at the beginning and end of the 2005–2015 274 
period, we took 3-year average values for each indicator (i.e. from 2005 to 2007, and from 2013 to 275 
2015, respectively). Average values were used to decrease the sensitivity of the estimates to year-276 
specific variation, and also to ensure that the full sample of countries was included for each 277 
wellbeing–consumption pair since not every country has an observation for every year in the 278 
unbalanced panel. The analysis is similar to previous studies on the changing relations between 279 
carbon emissions and objective wellbeing (Steinberger et al., 2012; Steinberger and Roberts, 2010), 280 
but represents the first time the method has been applied to subjective wellbeing measures, as far 281 
as we are aware.  282 
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3.4.2 Long-Run Relationships: Growing versus Non-Growing Economies 283 
Three different functional forms were used to test which model explains the most cross-country 284 
variation in the long-run change of each wellbeing–consumption pair. We compared a linear model, 285 
a quadratic model, and an interaction model as follows: 286 
∆ =  + ∆ +   (2) 
∆ =  + ∆ + ∆
 +  (3) 
∆ =  + ∆ +  + ∆ ∗  +   (4) 
Equation (2) estimates a continuous linear relationship between the (long-run) change in wellbeing 287 
∆  for country i, and the change in the country’s level of consumption ∆, where  is the 288 
intercept,  is the predicted change in wellbeing from a 1% change in long-run consumption 289 
growth, and   is the country-specific error term.  290 
Equation (3) estimates a continuous non-linear (curvilinear) relationship between the change in 291 
wellbeing and consumption of country i. In this case,  is the rate of change in wellbeing when 292 
consumption growth is equal to zero, while  gives both the direction and steepness of the 293 
curvature.  294 
Equation (4) is an interaction model that estimates an asymmetrical relationship between the 295 
change in wellbeing and consumption that depends on whether country i's consumption is growing 296 
or not, as indicated by a dummy variable  (equal to 1 if consumption is not growing). Here, 297 
 is the predicted change in wellbeing from a 1% change in country i's consumption when it is 298 
growing (and  is the intercept). If country i's consumption is not growing, then the predicted effect 299 
on wellbeing is given by adding the interaction coefficient  + , and the non-growing intercept is 300 
given by adding the dummy coefficient  + . Given the potential sensitivity of this approach to 301 
the threshold between “growing” and “non-growing” consumption, we tested three models (i.e. the 302 
threshold was set at zero, a percentage point above zero, and a percentage point below zero). 303 
In total, five models were specified to estimate the relationship between long-run changes in 304 
wellbeing and consumption (one linear model, one quadratic model, and three interaction models 305 
with the non-growing consumption dummy set to -1%, 0%, and 1%, respectively). The best-fit model 306 
for each wellbeing-consumption pair was chosen in two steps. First, the linear model was chosen if 307 
none of the larger models explained significantly more variation than the simplest model based on 308 
the F-test of an analysis of variance (ANOVA). Second, if any of the larger models were found to 309 
explain significantly more variation than the linear model in the first step, we chose the model with 310 
the highest adjusted R2 value. 311 
3.4.3 The Resilience of Wellbeing to Changes in Consumption 312 
The concept of “resilience” offers a way to interpret different relationships between wellbeing and 313 
consumption in growing and non-growing economies. Resilience refers to (i) the capacity of a system 314 
to self-organize and absorb shocks without shifting to a different state, and (ii) the ability to re-315 
organize and take advantage of new opportunities opened up by disturbances (Folke, 2006). A key 316 
insight is that resilience can be “good” if the system is in a desirable state, or “bad” if the system is in 317 
an undesirable state (Tanner et al., 2015). For example, macro-algae dominated reefs or urban slums 318 
are systems in undesirable states that may be highly resilient, which is to say they withstand 319 
attempts to transform them into different, more desirable states (Angeler and Allen, 2016). 320 
M
A
N
U
S
C
R
IP
T
 
A
C
C
E
P
T
E
D
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
9 
 
We characterised the resilience of wellbeing to changes in consumption in three steps. First, for each 321 
country we calculated an annual rate-of-change index (relative to a base year) for each wellbeing 322 
and consumption indicator. Second, national wellbeing was characterised as “resilient” if it changed 323 
by less than consumption over the same period, or “sensitive” if it changed by more than 324 
consumption. Third, the relationship was characterised as “desirable” if wellbeing increased by more 325 
than consumption, or if it declined by less than consumption. We characterised the relationship as 326 
“undesirable” if wellbeing increased by less than consumption, or if it declined by more than 327 
consumption. 328 
3.4.4 Multiple Regression Panel Analysis 329 
Multiple regression panel analysis provides a useful robustness check to test the results of the long-330 
run analysis described in Section 3.4.2. It is also the method employed by studies that tend to find a 331 
significant relation between income growth and happiness, allowing our results to be directly 332 
compared to those on both sides of the Easterlin paradox debate. Pooled OLS multiple regression 333 
analysis was used to estimate the contribution of consumption to national average wellbeing 334 
alongside perceived levels of social capital and autonomy. The estimated model is as follows: 335 
 =  +  + +   (5) 
where   is the national average wellbeing indicator for country i in year t,  is the vector of 336 
coefficients for independent variables that vary over time,  is the matrix of independent variable 337 
values for each country and year,  is the country-specific term that controls for unobserved 338 
heterogeneity within countries, and  is the year-specific term that controls for unobserved 339 
heterogeneity over time. Individual country and year fixed effects were included in the preferred 340 
model based on their significance compared to alternative models with no such effects (F-test). 341 
Robust standard errors controlling for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation were estimated after 342 
testing for their presence in the unbalanced panel dataset. 343 
4 Results 344 
This section presents the findings of each of the four methods described in Section 3.4. We find that 345 
for a given level of consumption, life expectancy is increasing over time, but happiness is not 346 
(Section 4.1). In fact, life expectancy increases steadily in all countries with no relation to 347 
consumption, while happiness shows an asymmetrical relationship that depends on whether 348 
consumption is growing or not (Section 4.2). When consumption does not grow, happiness tends to 349 
decrease, although it is more sensitive to declines in income than declines in carbon footprint 350 
(Section 4.3). The relationship for each wellbeing–consumption pair holds when additional indicators 351 
are included (social support and autonomy) using multiple regression panel analysis (Section 4.4).  352 
4.1 Comparison of Cross-Sectional Relationships  353 
The relationship between happiness and consumption is fairly stable over the 2005–2015 time 354 
period considered in our analysis (Figure 1a, b), while the relationship between life expectancy and 355 
consumption has changed over time to be less consumption-intensive (Figure 1c, d). The results are 356 
remarkably similar when consumption is measured in terms of either GDP or carbon footprints. 357 
For a given level of income or carbon footprint, life expectancy is increasing over time but happiness 358 
is not. Or seen the other way, a given level of life expectancy is associated with a lower level of 359 
income and emissions at the end of the period compared to the beginning, whereas happiness 360 
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shows no such change. Indeed, the level of happiness associated with a given level of income 361 
decreases slightly over the analysis period.   362 
 
Figure 1. Cross-sectional relationships for (a) life satisfaction and GDP per capita, (b) life satisfaction and carbon footprint 
per capita, (c) life expectancy and GDP per capita, and (d) life expectancy and carbon footprint per capita, using 3-year 
averages at the beginning (blue) and end (orange) of the 2005–2015 period. 95% confidence interval bands are shown with 
a lighter tint around each regression curve. See Table 1 for regression coefficients and Supplementary Data for country-
level data.  
At the beginning of the period, 75 years of life expectancy and a life satisfaction of 6 out of 10 were 363 
both associated with a per capita income of $20,000 and a carbon footprint of 6.7 tonnes CO2. By 364 
the end of the period, the same 75 years of life expectancy could be achieved with 25% less income 365 
and 35% less carbon (i.e. $15,000 and 4.3 tonnes CO2, respectively). In contrast, the same life 366 
satisfaction of 6 out of 10 at the end of the period was associated with slightly more income and 367 
carbon ($21,500 and 6.8 tonnes CO2). 368 
Table 1. Cross-Sectional Regression Results for Wellbeing–Consumption Pairs at the Beginning and End of 
the 2005–2015 period  
 Dependent variables: 
 Life Satisfaction (0–10 Cantril Scale) Life Expectancy (years) 
 2005–07 2013–15 2005–07 2013–15 2005–07 2013–15 2005–07 2013–15 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log GDP per 
capita 
0.784
***
 0.796
***
   5.554
***
 5.453
***
   
(0.045) (0.043)   (0.416) (0.378)   
         
Log CO2 
Footprint 
  0.597
***
 0.634
***
   4.465
***
 4.626
***
 
  (0.048) (0.049)   (0.427) (0.470) 
         
Constant 
-1.742
***
 -1.919
***
 0.762
*
 0.423 20.09
***
 22.53
***
 35.66
***
 36.30
***
 
(0.395) (0.390) (0.385) (0.387) (4.044) (3.722) (3.696) (4.012) 
         
Countries 117 117 99 99 109 109 91 91 
Adjusted R
2
 0.698 0.660 0.554 0.503 0.688 0.710 0.625 0.614 
Notes: OLS regression on 3-year averages of each wellbeing–consumption pair at the beginning (2005–07) and end 
(2013–15) of the 2005–2015 analysis period. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; 
***p<0.001.  
  369 
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4.2 Long-Run Relationships: Growing versus Non-Growing Economies 370 
Our analysis of long-run changes in wellbeing and consumption over the 2005–2015 period finds 371 
that consuming less is generally associated with a decline in happiness, while consuming more has 372 
no discernible effect on happiness (Figure 2a, b). This finding suggests a fundamental difference in 373 
the relationship between happiness and consumption in growing versus non-growing economies. In 374 
contrast, life expectancy increases steadily in all countries, and appears unaffected by changes in 375 
consumption (Figure 2c, d). 376 
 
Figure 2. The relationship between long-run annual trends (denoted by Δ) in: (a) life satisfaction and GDP per capita, (b) life 
satisfaction and carbon footprint per capita, (c) life expectancy and GDP per capita, and (d) life expectancy and carbon 
footprint per capita, across countries over the 2005–2015 period. Best-fit curves and adjusted-R
2
 values are shown on each 
plot. The best-fit threshold between “growing” and “non-growing” consumption groups is shown by the vertical dashed 
line in (a) and (b), while the horizontal dashed line shows zero change in the dependent variable. Slopes are significant at 
p<0.05 with 95% confidence interval (CI) bands shown in light grey. See Table 2 for regression coefficients and 
Supplementary Data for country-level data. 
For the happiness–income pair (Figure 2a), we find no evidence that happiness increases across 377 
countries with rising income (N = 80), but we do find evidence that happiness declines across 378 
countries with incomes that do not rise (N = 37). These asymmetrical long-run results are consistent 379 
with De Neve et al.’s (2017) short-run findings. Out of the five models that we tested, the interaction 380 
model that categorises countries with growth rates less than 1% per year as non-growing provides 381 
the best-fit model for GDP per capita (see Section 3.4.2 for a description of the linear, quadratic, and 382 
interaction models tested). 383 
Each percentage point drop in long-run GDP per capita below 1% per year is associated with a 384 
significant decline in happiness of 0.03 points per year. In other words, we find that a decline in 385 
income of 5% per year would be associated with a 1-point decline in happiness after only 8 years, 386 
based on current relationships. In contrast, the happiness–income relation across countries in the 387 
growing group is not statistically significant, and even if it were, the estimated effect is less than one 388 
fifth the size of the relation in non-growing countries.  389 
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Table 2. Long-Run Regression Results for Wellbeing-Consumption Pairs (2005-2015) 
 Dependent variables: 
 ΔLife Satisfaction  
(0-10 scale) 
ΔLife Expectancy 
(years) 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ΔGDP per capita 0.005  0.005  
(0.004)  (0.006)  
     
ΔCO2 Footprint per 
capita 
 0.003  0.008 
 (0.003)  (0.004) 
     
NoGrowDummy -0.040
*
 0.031   
(0.016) (0.021)   
     
ΔGDP per capita  
x NoGrowDummy 
0.021
*
    
(0.011)    
     
ΔCO2 Footprint per 
capita x NoGrowDummy 
 0.018
**
   
 (0.006)   
     
Constant 0.287
***
 0.280
***
 0.009 -0.0002 
(0.016) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016) 
     
Countries 117 99 109 91 
Adjusted R
2
 0.25 0.13 0.00 0.03 
Notes: Best-fit OLS models for explaining long-run trends in each wellbeing-consumption pair (robust standard errors).  
*
p<0.05; 
**
p<0.01; 
***
p<0.001. 
For the happiness–carbon pair (Figure 2b), the relationships are similar to the happiness–income 390 
findings (Figure 2a). That is, we find an asymmetrical relationship in which happiness is not related 391 
to carbon footprint when the latter is growing (N = 56), but happiness is related to carbon footprint 392 
when the latter is not growing (N = 43). The interaction model that categorises countries with long-393 
run growth rates less than 0% per year as non-growing provides the best-fit model for carbon 394 
footprint. 395 
In contrast to the happiness–income results, where non-growing income is always associated with a 396 
decline in happiness, a mild decline in carbon footprint (i.e. between -2% and 0% per year) is not 397 
significantly associated with a decline in happiness. However, we find that a larger decline in carbon 398 
footprint per capita of 5% per year would be associated with a 1-point decline in happiness after 10 399 
years, based on current relationships. This finding is troubling from a climate change perspective 400 
because a global mitigation rate of 5% per year would take around 80 years to decarbonise the 401 
economy (Le Quéré et al., 2018). For the group of countries with growing carbon footprints, the 402 
estimated happiness–carbon relationship is one seventh the size of the non-growing relationship, 403 
and not statistically significant. 404 
The long-run health–income (Figure 2c) and health–carbon (Figure 2d) relationships across countries 405 
are also very similar to one another. Essentially, the number of years an infant can expect to live is 406 
increasing in all countries (the average increase is an additional 3.6 months per year), and the 407 
increase bears no relation to whether income or carbon footprint is growing or not. None of the 408 
alternative models that we tested provide a better fit than the linear model for the long-run health–409 
income and health–carbon relationships. These findings are more promising than the happiness 410 
results because they suggest the universal trend towards longer, healthier lives may be compatible 411 
with ambitious mitigation policy. 412 
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4.3 The Resilience of Wellbeing to Changes in Consumption 413 
The results presented so far have focused on the general relationships between wellbeing and 414 
consumption in growing versus non-growing economies. However, there is also considerable 415 
variability in how these indicators have changed over time in individual countries (with the exception 416 
of life expectancy which increases steadily in all countries). Here, we illustrate possible pathways 417 
countries may follow by characterising the resilience or sensitivity of wellbeing to changes in 418 
consumption in four nations (Figure 3). 419 
In Spain (Figure 3a), life satisfaction declined by more than GDP did in percentage terms—a case of 420 
undesirable sensitivity of happiness to declining income levels. It would clearly be preferable for life 421 
satisfaction to decline by less than GDP, a situation exemplified by Ireland (Figure 3b), which we 422 
label as desirable resilience. By contrast, life satisfaction increased by much less than income and 423 
carbon footprint in Vietnam (Figure 3c), a case of the undesirable resilience of happiness to 424 
increasing consumption levels. If consumption increases, then the hope would be for life satisfaction 425 
to increase by at least as much, a situation observed in Nicaragua (Figure 3d), which we characterize 426 
as desirable sensitivity. 427 
 
Figure 3. Country plots of annual rate-of-change indices over time (relative to a base year), illustrating four wellbeing–
consumption pathways. The top two panels show countries where GDP is largely declining, while the bottom two panels 
show countries where it is increasing.  In Panel (a) for Spain, life satisfaction declines by more than GDP, a case of 
“undesirable sensitivity”. In Panel (b) for Ireland, life satisfaction declines by less than GDP, a case of “desirable resilience”. 
In Panel (c) for Vietnam, life satisfaction increases by less than GDP, a case of “undesirable resilience”. In Panel (d) for 
Nicaragua, life satisfaction increases by more than GDP, a case of “desirable sensitivity”. Life expectancy increases steadily 
in all cases. See https://goodlife.leeds.ac.uk/paradox for an interactive website that produces plots for all countries.  
In the majority of the 100 countries that we analysed, happiness is either undesirably sensitive to 428 
decreases in income (N = 29) or undesirably resilient to increases in income (N = 60). Only 6 429 
countries are desirably sensitive to income growth, while 5 countries are desirably resilient to 430 
income contractions. At the same time, happiness in most countries is generally resilient to changes 431 
in carbon footprint: it is desirably resilient when carbon footprint declines (N = 35), and undesirably 432 
resilient when it increases (N = 51). This latter finding is particularly worrying because it suggests 433 
that emissions growth brings very little (if any) return in terms of wellbeing, but it does have an 434 
unambiguous cost in terms of climate stability. 435 
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4.4 Multiple Regression Panel Analysis 436 
The results presented so far suggest that whether changes in consumption are relevant to explaining 437 
changes in wellbeing across countries depends on whether consumption is growing or not, and 438 
diverse pathways are possible notwithstanding the general trends. Clearly, consumption is only one 439 
potential factor that determines overall wellbeing. Table 3 therefore presents multivariate panel 440 
regression results for each wellbeing indicator. The panel includes consumption indicators (using 441 
GDP and carbon footprint as alternative proxies) alongside two other well-known determinants of 442 
wellbeing: social capital and personal autonomy. 443 
The panel analysis (Table 3) reaffirms the earlier findings. It suggests that per capita GDP and carbon 444 
footprint are important predictors of life satisfaction in non-growing economies, but not in growing 445 
economies, even after controlling for additional explanatory variables and unobserved 446 
heterogeneity across countries and over time. Neither consumption indicator is an important 447 
predictor of life expectancy.  448 
Table 3. Multiple Regressions to Explain National Wellbeing 
 Dependent variables: 
 Life Satisfaction (0-10 scale) Life expectancy (years) 
Independent 
variable 
ΔGDP ≤ 1% ΔGDP > 1% ΔCO2 ≤ 0% ΔCO2 > 0% Full Sample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Log GDP Per 
Capita 
1.483
*
 0.452   0.169  
(0.732) (0.366)   (0.511)  
       
Log CO2 Footprint 
Per Capita 
  1.146
***
 0.389  0.437 
  (0.254) (0.231)  (0.314) 
       
Social Support 0.013 0.016
***
 0.017
*
 0.016
**
 0.012
*
 0.009 
(0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) 
       
Autonomy 0.013
**
 0.007
*
 0.012
**
 0.009
*
 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
       
Countries 36 73 41 50 109 91 
Observations 302 670 361 455 972 816 
Adjusted R
2
 0.941 0.898 0.918 0.872 0.996 0.996 
Notes: Pooled OLS models for unbalanced panels with country and year fixed effects included. ΔGDP 
denotes long-run change in annual GDP per capita. ΔCO2 denotes long-run change in annual carbon 
footprint per capita. Only countries with observations spanning at least 9 years over the 2005–2015 period 
are included. Robust standard errors of the coefficients are reported in parentheses. 
*
p<0.05; 
**
p<0.01; 
***
p<0.001. 
The sizes of the wellbeing–consumption effects in the multivariate panel analysis are only marginally 449 
smaller than the results using Easterlin’s bivariate long-run method, which suggests that omitted 450 
variables and/or unobserved heterogeneity play a minor, albeit significant, role. The panel results 451 
estimate that a 1 point decline in happiness would take 17 years (13 years) with a 5% per year 452 
decline in carbon footprint per capita (GDP per capita), compared to 10 years (8 years) with 453 
Easterlin’s method. For growing economies, the happiness–income and happiness–carbon panel 454 
coefficients are not statistically significant, and even if they were, their magnitude suggests a 1 point 455 
increase in happiness would take ~50 years to achieve with income or carbon footprint growth of 5% 456 
per year. 457 
Autonomy and social support are both statistically significant across four of the six models, which 458 
suggests they are important features of wellbeing irrespective of whether consumption is increasing 459 
or decreasing. Social support has the most consistent effect on wellbeing across all models, and it is 460 
also generally the largest single predictor of national average happiness and health. Although 461 
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autonomy contributes significantly to happiness, our results suggest its effect on health is negligible. 462 
Indeed, we find that the steady increase in life expectancy observed across countries is not 463 
explained at all by changes in consumption or autonomy after taking into account country- and year-464 
specific fixed effects. 465 
5 Discussion 466 
When countries are compared at a point in time, wellbeing and consumption appear to be linked, 467 
but only up to a point after which more consumption contributes little to wellbeing (Figure 1). It has 468 
been suggested that wealthy countries that have crossed this turning point could reduce resource 469 
use considerably with little effect on wellbeing, thereby freeing up ecological space for poorer 470 
countries to increase consumption to meet basic needs (Kerschner, 2010; Raworth, 2017). If life 471 
expectancy is used to measure wellbeing, then our results support this view because people are 472 
living longer irrespective of whether consumption declines or increases. However, if happiness is 473 
used to measure wellbeing, then our results do not support this view, as a decline in consumption is 474 
associated with a decline in happiness.  475 
Most of the countries with increasing income and carbon footprint are nations with relatively low 476 
levels of wellbeing that arguably have the most to gain from increasing consumption, but we see no 477 
such effect on either wellbeing indicator. These findings suggest Easterlin’s happiness–income 478 
paradox can be seen as a specific case of a general “wellbeing–consumption paradox” where 479 
consumption and wellbeing are correlated at a point in time, but increasing consumption does not 480 
significantly increase wellbeing (although decreasing consumption may still reduce it, as with 481 
happiness). 482 
The pursuit of economic growth appears to be a dangerously inefficient strategy to increase 483 
wellbeing in a climate-constrained world. We find that there is no statistically significant relationship 484 
between income growth and happiness, and even if there were, the size of the effect suggests that a 485 
1 point increase in happiness would require ~50 years of income growth at 5% per year. This 12-fold 486 
increase in economic activity would take place over a period when global carbon emissions already 487 
need to decline by ~10% per year for a likely chance to meet the 2 °C target without negative 488 
emissions technologies (Anderson, 2015). In other words, to keep warming below 2 °C and increase 489 
world average happiness by a single point over the next 50 years would require carbon emissions to 490 
be decoupled from global economic activity at an implausibly high rate of ~15% per year.  491 
While life satisfaction and life expectancy tend to follow a parallel trajectory in growing economies, 492 
the same is not true for non-growing economies. Non-growing consumption is associated with 493 
significant declines in happiness, but not with declines in life expectancy. These diverging findings 494 
highlight the complementary nature of objective and subjective measures of wellbeing. Together, 495 
the two indicators suggest that the 2005–2015 period was a difficult time for many people (as 496 
indicated by declines in happiness), but it was not so difficult that the provision of basic needs broke 497 
down (as indicated by the lack of effect on life expectancy). 498 
The finding that a decrease in carbon footprint is associated with a decline in happiness represents a 499 
major challenge to the achievement of the 2 °C climate target. A mitigation rate of ~6% per year 500 
would be needed to reduce the average carbon footprint of countries in our non-growing group 501 
from 10 t CO2 per capita in 2015 down to 1.6 t by 2050, a level proposed to be broadly consistent 502 
with the 2 °C target (O’Neill et al., 2018). However, happiness in these predominantly wealthy 503 
countries would decline by 2.5 out of 10 points over the same period, based on current relationships 504 
(and assuming that countries did not adapt to sustained declines in emissions to some degree).  505 
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For the majority of countries with non-growing consumption, happiness fell by more than income 506 
over the past decade, but less than carbon footprint (in percentage terms). This finding generally 507 
supports the green growth view of emissions mitigation, which argues that the way to achieve 508 
climate objectives without sacrificing current well-being is to avoid contractions in GDP (New 509 
Climate Economy, 2014). That said, current mitigation rates are too slow to meet climate targets and 510 
an unplanned economic contraction (as observed in many countries over the past decade) could 511 
have a rather different effect on happiness than a voluntary transition to a non-growing economy. 512 
In this sense, our findings could be interpreted by advocates of “degrowth” as evidence that 513 
societies must “decolonize their imagination” from growth to achieve the required decreases in 514 
carbon emissions without undue hardship (D’Alisa et al., 2014). Degrowth and postgrowth scholars 515 
seek to liberate public debate from unquestioned reliance on economic growth to imagine radical 516 
alternatives that equitably downscale consumption to sustainable levels, while maintaining or 517 
enhancing human wellbeing (Büchs and Koch, 2017; Schneider et al., 2010). In a recent review of the 518 
degrowth literature, Kallis et al. (2018) find that economic contractions need not lead to declines in 519 
happiness if accompanied by redistribution and a shared sense of prosperity that values community 520 
and the environment. 521 
Our results also contribute to growing interest in “demand-side” climate solutions that target 522 
strategies to change consumption behaviour and understand their wellbeing implications alongside 523 
the mainstream focus on supply-side technical solutions (Creutzig et al., 2018). The upcoming sixth 524 
assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) will feature a chapter 525 
on demand that asks how demand-side mitigation measures impact on human wellbeing, among 526 
other questions (Ibid.). Our findings provide a baseline that suggests people in countries with 527 
mitigation rates relatively close to the rates required to meet climate targets can expect to live 528 
longer, but less happy lives, on average. 529 
Overall, the asymmetrical results on happiness in growing versus non-growing economies are 530 
consistent with previous research at national and individual levels, with the added concern that 531 
these happiness–income relations also apply to carbon footprint. The concept of loss aversion is the 532 
most common explanation for why growth does not make people happier, while a lack of it makes 533 
them unhappier (De Neve et al., 2017). Unfulfilled expectations appear to play a central role via the 534 
associated frustration and futility (anticipated or experienced) that arise when plans go worse than 535 
expected.   536 
Interestingly, Boyce et al. (2016) find that highly conscientious, goal-oriented people experience 537 
large losses in happiness when their incomes decline, while people low in conscientiousness 538 
experience no significant reduction in happiness. Thus, our finding that non-growing consumption is 539 
accompanied by declines in happiness could be driven by a subset of people high in 540 
conscientiousness who experience very large losses. In short, it seems that the less people aspire 541 
towards high levels of consumption, the smaller the loss in their wellbeing when material aspirations 542 
are not fulfilled (Matthey, 2010). There is evidence that major life events can result in changes to 543 
individual personality (Boyce et al., 2015), which provides one possible avenue for future research to 544 
better understand how to steer aspirations towards low-carbon lifestyles during economic 545 
downturns.     546 
Finally, our empirical analysis of the relationships between wellbeing and consumption in growing 547 
versus non-growing economies has some important limitations. Although we argue that the 2005–548 
2015 period provides a natural experiment to explore wellbeing implications of fairly deep emissions 549 
cuts in the absence of ambitious mitigation policy, we also recognize that a single decade is barely 550 
M
A
N
U
S
C
R
IP
T
 
A
C
C
E
P
T
E
D
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
17 
 
sufficient to assess long-run trends. As more time-series data become available, further research will 551 
be able to re-assess our findings. Additionally, current relationships may not be a good guide for the 552 
future if ambitious action is successful in eliminating the fossil fuel dependence of modern 553 
economies in the coming decades. Still, it is useful to have an idea of where we currently stand even 554 
if the goal is to end up elsewhere. Last but not least, our analysis provides an indication of the 555 
relationships between changes in consumption and wellbeing across countries, but it provides little 556 
guidance on how to manage the social and technical processes that drive these relationships 557 
towards climate-friendly outcomes. Additional research is needed to better understand cross-558 
country differences in the social and technical provisioning systems that mediate the relationships 559 
between resource use, consumption, the achievement of basic needs, and ultimately, human 560 
wellbeing. 561 
6 Conclusions 562 
This study examined the relationships between wellbeing and consumption in countries with 563 
growing versus non-growing economies over the 2005–2015 period. By integrating insights from 564 
happiness economics and sustainability science, our analysis makes three contributions.  565 
First, we have expanded Easterlin’s happiness–income work by including two additional indicators, 566 
namely life expectancy and carbon footprint per capita. Our approach views life satisfaction and life 567 
expectancy as complementary measures of wellbeing, whereas GDP and carbon footprint are seen 568 
as alternative measures of consumption. We find that the happiness–income paradox can be seen as 569 
a specific case of a generalised “wellbeing–consumption paradox”. Each wellbeing–consumption pair 570 
is strongly correlated at a point in time, but wellbeing does not increase with either GDP per capita 571 
or carbon footprint per capita in the long-run. 572 
Second, the wellbeing–carbon relationships are remarkably similar to the wellbeing–income 573 
relationships, which demonstrates the continued fossil fuel dependence of consumption. Of 574 
particular concern from a climate change perspective, we show for the first time that there is 575 
currently an asymmetrical relationship between happiness and carbon footprint that depends on 576 
whether emissions are growing or not. For the group of countries with declining carbon footprint, 577 
happiness tends to decline as well. In contrast, for the group of countries with growing carbon 578 
footprint, the relationship is nil. More optimistically, life expectancy increases in all countries, and 579 
bears no relation to consumption whatsoever. These results are robust to the inclusion of additional 580 
explanatory variables (social support and autonomy) and after controlling for unobserved 581 
heterogeneity across countries and over time.  582 
Finally, in recognition of the variability across countries for each wellbeing–consumption pair, we 583 
characterised four illustrative pathways that countries have followed. The criteria were based on (i) 584 
the resilience or sensitivity of wellbeing to changes in consumption, and (ii) the desirability of that 585 
resilience or sensitivity based on growing and non-growing consumption trends. The vast majority of 586 
countries have happiness levels that increase by less (or even decrease) in percentage terms 587 
compared to consumption growth (i.e. undesirable resilience). In most countries with non-growing 588 
income, happiness decreased by more than the associated drop in income (i.e. undesirable 589 
sensitivity). In contrast, happiness declined by less than carbon footprint in most of the countries 590 
with non-growing per capita carbon footprints (i.e. desirable resilience). 591 
Overall, our findings suggest that in order to achieve climate targets without sacrificing current well-592 
being, non-growing GDP per capita should be avoided — at least based on current relationships. 593 
However, observed decoupling trends are insufficient to meet climate targets. If the 2-degree target 594 
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is to be met, then either decoupling must be vastly improved, or happiness must be made more 595 
resilient to a decline in income. 596 
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